Biology
explains life in carbon form, as matter in highly organized entities
with complex forms, composed of cells and complex molecules. Life as a
long process of evolution, has emerged out of interactions between
great numbers of non-living molecules. Artificial life claims to mimic
this biological phenomenon in different media like bio-chemistry (wet
alife), robotics (hard alife) and in silicon form inside the computer
(soft alife).This may lead to create similar or even identical
instances of life. The agenda of Alife is to study life-as-it-could-be
and not as-we-know-it-on-earth.
Creation
of life in simulated environments has its roots to Jon von Neuman; he
designed the first artificial-life model when he created his famous
self-reproducing, computation-universal cellular automata. His work
gave way to simulate the process of increasing order of complexity
observed in nature emerging out of interactions between entities at
lower level. The basic intuition is instead of taking top down
reductive explanation of constituent structure, we take a bottom- up
approach by defining systems at lowest level, with simple but
non-trivial rules and allow them to interact, if this results in to
something organized, with increased complexity we look for “Emergence”.
Within
soft Alife the focus is natural generation of complex objects through
study of interacting systems, behavioral models and to seek for
emergent behavior. It is difficult to construct a theory or model which
describes “emergence” or emergent phenomena, because the property is
emergent if it cannot be comprehended by the underlying system model.
Emergence occurs if “more is different”, i.e. if there are properties
of group that which cannot be explained by properties of the parts,
entities or agents alone. It occurs when a simple set of causal rules
form complex patterns when they are played out in the system. The
patterns formed are not reducible to the simple set of rules that form
them. An interesting aspect in the process of emergence is the
observation of effect without an apparent cause, which distinguishes
between local, low level components and global, high level patterns.
Complexity theory identifies four types of Emergence; (1) Simple/Nominal Emergence:
It is totally predictable, each component and element has a fixed and
constant role, which is not allowed to change in the course of time. A
system in form of a machine has for instance a function which is
different from the function of the parts and components, but the
overall function is well-known, and it only matches the planned and
designed function. There are no unpredicted or unexpected behavior
patterns. (2)Weak emergence:
Weak emergence is the form of emergence related to swarms, flocks and
other social groups. It describes emergence forms with simple feedback,
which is predictable in principle, but not in every detail. Top-down
feedback from the group imposes in turn constraints on the local
interactions. An example is a flock of Geese, which limits the possible
movements of the individual birds. (3) Multiple Emergences:
Multiple emergence is a form of emergence with multiple positive and
negative feedback loops. The behavior is not predictable, and can be
chaotic. Completely new roles can appear, while old roles disappear. A
typical example for multiple emergence are bubbles and droplets. (4) Strong Emergence:
This is the strongest possible sense of emergence , the weakest form of
causal dependence. It is not predictable, even in principle, because it
describes the appearance of a new code or completely new system in a
multi-level or multi-scale system with many levels. Any attempt of
explaining emergent macroscopic, high-level phenomena in terms of
microscopic low-level phenomena is useless and futile. Strong emergence
is the emergence of a whole new system, with new building blocks and
interaction laws. The "strong" emergence of a system is identical or at
least closely related to the simulation or representation of a system
through another system - simulation is the attempt to represent certain
features of the behavior of a system by the behavior of another system.
The interface between the new and the old system is described by a new
code or language. . They can be distinguished by the different degree
of predictability and the different types of roles.
Programming
emergence in computer environments leads us to a twofold intuition (a)
What we can construct we are also able to explain for e.g. a detailed
procedure for assembling a machine may give us enough information to
construct an explanation of its workings in the form of an algorithmic
description of rules for its change of state. (b) Complex things in
nature construct themselves as wholes via long process of local
interactions between simple entities; this emergence of whole or
collective behavior of units should be mimicked in our algorithm. The
good example of programming of emergent behavior is of “Langton’s Ant”.
It is a two-dimensional cellular automata with a very simple set of
rules but complicated emergent behavior. It was invented by Chris
Langton in 1986. Rules of are:
Squares
on a plane are colored variously either black or white. We arbitrarily
identify one square as the "ant". The ant can travel in any of the four
cardinal directions at each step it takes. The ant moves according to
the rules below:
1) At a black square, turn 90 degree right, flip the color of the square, move forward one unit 2) At a white square, turn 90 degree left, flip the color of the square, move forward one unit
Langton’s
ant would seem to be a simple animal – after all the rules are less
than complex. In fact the ant displays behavior which can be termed as
emergent. Suppose you start the ant in an eastwards direction on a
white grid; the first move will turn the ant right so that it is facing
south and take it forwards one square, turning the starting square
black. As it is now on a white square the ant will turn right so that
it is now facing west and then moves it onto another white square,
turning the last square black. After a few moves the ant will start
revisiting earlier squares that have turned black. Very quickly the
ant’s movements become quite complicated. Every so often during the
first few hundred moves the ant produces a nice symmetrical pattern.
After this things get rather chaotic for a few thousand moves, then
something amazing happens; the ant gets locked into a cycle that
repeats the same sequence of 104 moves, the overall result being to
move the ant two squares diagonally down towards the left. It continues
like this forever (or until the ant encounters some previous trail),
systematically building a broad diagonal “highway. This behavior is
interesting, but experiments show that if you scatter any number of
black squares around before the ant sets off, it still ends up building
the highway. The problem baffling mathematicians is that nobody can
provide proof that the ant always ends up building a highway for every
possible configuration of black squares, though it certainly seems that
it does. Following is the video of simulation of Langton’s Ant.
Langton’s
Ant provides a good example of ‘emergent behavior’ but none the less it
is tempting to ask what is the relation between explaining life by
constructing computational models of lifelike behavior and defining the
so created `emergent' patterns as true instances of life? Is Artificial
Life redefining the notion of living systems in biology, or does it for
the first time give a universally valid definition of life? Should we
really believe in the explanatory strategy of the of Artificial Life,
that life in a genuine sense (not just representations, but the very
phenomenon) can be artificially created in vitro, or in silico, so that
ALife research contributes to explore life from a much more universal
point of view? How can one be sure that life simply can be defined as
"the emergence (in any kind of medium) of complex structures with
certain life-like properties"? What makes this notion counterintuitive
to some biologists? Do organisms have to be material? And why have
biologists been so reluctant to give clear definitions of life that
could be used as a measure to hold up against the simulation when the
alifer claims it to be a `real' living thing? We may even ask: What may
be the meaning of the fact that all attempts to formulate a
satisfactory definition of life have failed?